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Abstract: The paper presents an alternative to tests of Covered Interest
Parity for establishing the impact of liberalizing the capital account when
credible proxies for expectations of depreciation are not available. A model
of domestic interest rate determination during liberalization is tested using
a variety of tests for structural break on the Japanese experience in 1979-80
first with, then without, a foreign return with identical inferences. It is then
applied to the Chilean liberalization from 1979-82 for which forward rates
are not available. It is shown that Chilean interest rates behave as if
determined domestically, despite vast inflows, until very late in the reform
period. The way in which capital enters an economy, and particularly the
elasticity of inflows with respect to interest differentials, is confirmed to be
more important than the amount in determining whether interest parity will
hold.
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I. Introduction
It is now common to measure the degree of capital mobility among industrialized countries by testing
for covered interest parity (CIP): in the absence of barriers to arbitrage, similar assets should yield similar
returns across countries when adjusted for the risk of currency realignment embodied in the forward discount.
In the same spirit, convergence toward CIP has been used as a test of capital account liberalization by Artus
and Taylor(1984) for the UK, Frankel (1984) and Eken(1984) for Japan, and Frankel and Chinn (1992) for
the Pacific basin. Yet, for a majority of countries that are now contemplating liberalization, forward markets
are non-existent, rendering the straightforward arbitrage test inadequate.
This paper presents a way of inferring the impact of measures to open the capital account in an
indirect manner by looking only at the behavior of the domestic determinants of interest rates. A complete
model including both domestic factors and the "world" interest rate is tested by tracking the determinants of
Japanese interest rates across the capital account liberalization in 1979-80. It is then shown that the same
conclusions about the opening of the capital account can be deduced even when no measure of foreign returns
is included in the regression, thus showing the validity of applying the methodology to situations where no
forward rates exist. One such case, the celebrated and controversial capital account opening in Chile from 1979
to 1982, has presented something of a puzzle for ten years. Following the elimination of most capital
controls, and amidst vast inflows, domestic interest rates rose in real terms to levels of 40% for over two years
and contributed integrally to the eventual collapse of the economy. * Some observers (Edwards 1985,
Dornbusch 1985, among others) have asserted interest parity and held responsible expectations of depreciation,
brought on by imprudent exchange rate policy. Numerous others (Harberger 1985, Arellano 1983) have
stressed extraordinary domestic demands for credit as an alternative explanation, thereby implicitly embracing
the view that the financial sector behaved as if relatively closed. It is shown that Chilean interest rates behave
as if the capital account were closed for much of the period after liberalization, despite massive inflows. The
key to the paradox is shown to lie in the discontinuous nature of the capital inflows and a persistent excess
1 Galvez and Tybout (1985), Mizala-Salces(1985)
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demand for credit. It is not only the magnitude of the inflows, but also the way in which they enter that
appears important to whether interest parity will hold.
II. Modeling a Liberalizing Capital Account
Kouri and Porter (1974) provide the first systematic theoretical treatment of an opening capital
account by introducing a foreign assets with varying degrees of substitutability for domestic assets in a portfolio
balance context. Following a different conceptual tack, Edwards(1985) and Edwards and Khan(1985) made
perhaps the first attempt to empirically estimate the degree of capital market integration using Colombia,
Chile and Singapore as case studies. In essence, their model takes the two extremes represented by a closed
economy interest rate determination model, and the interest parity condition and then weights them using a
"coefficient of openess." As will be shown, this approach, while intuitively appealing, is problematic and leads
to an econometric specification that is probably not measuring openess as they thought. With some
adaptations to an inflationary environment, therefore, the present approach builds on Kouri and Porter.
In a simple open economy domestic agents can hold four assets in their portfolios: Money(M),
Domestic Bonds(B) paying a return R, a foreign bond(F) paying R*, a nominal interest rate plus expectations
of depreciation, and an asset, perhaps land (L), effectively indexed to inflation (tt). The wealth constraint
implies that all arguments enter into all asset demand functions so that
A d = A(R,R\n e,Y,W) V A = [MM,F,L) (2)
The wealth constraint also implies that
Y,Ai = E-r1 = ° v ' - ww^'M (3)
A A Af
Monetary equilibrium requires that
AM(Y,R,R',n',W) = ADC + CA * KA <4)
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where DC is domestic credit and CA and KA, the current and capital accounts respectively, reflect the reserve
component of the money supply. It is assumed, for expositional purposes, that the money multiplier is unity.
The capital account can be seen as the change in foreign demand for domestic assets, represented by an
analogous demand function where * indicates the foreign country, minus the change in domestic demand for
foreign assets:
KA = &B' (Y*JUT ,n €\W) - AF(YJiJt',n e ,W) (5 )
Combining (4) and (5) and invoking equation (3), to solve for the change in the domestic interest rate with
the second order foreign arguments dropped yields a semi-reduced form equation:
Afl = P,AZ>C + P 2C4 + p 3A/ + P 4Att' + $ 5AW + P 6A/T (6)
where
M, j
L + B L + B L + B
B = _J l R = — - B = — -
(7)
B(X)R . + B(k)'
6
e
e = -[l
r
* b(X)
r
* Ba)'R]
BR.,5;.,Ir5r 5n <0
B
K>
5
J«' K' LW BW > °
Here, X represents the degree of openness of the capital account which is the key determinant of the
magnitude of substitutability between domestic and foreign bonds as represented by the four domestic and
foreign partial derivatives. These in turn determine the value of each coefficient in (7). In an entirely closed
economy with X = 0, there is no substitution between domestic and foreign assets so both BR , and B*R =
making 9 finite and fi6 = 0. This leaves something reminiscent of a Fisher equation where expectations of
inflation affect the interest rate while the nominal return on foreign assets and expectations of depreciation
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do not.
As X rises, BR and B*R -* « and BR . and B*R . -» - », forcing 9 to infinity, all coefficients with
finite numerators, /3 1 to 5 , go to zero , and /36 to unity. The intuition is straightforward. Any domestic factor
that might increase the interest rate-- a contraction of domestic credit, an increase in demand for transaction
balances, or an increase in expectations of inflation-leads to an immediate capital inflow that forces the
interest rate back to the world rate. The return to foreign bonds inclusive of expectations of depreciation
completely determines movements in domestic interest rates as in the standard uncovered interest parity
condition.
Equation (6) differs from that estimated by Kahn and Edwards only by excluding the endogenously
determined capital account contribution to the money supply. But the difference is critical. By replacing CA
+ ADC with the total AMI, they in effect ask, "if we control for changes in the money supply due to an open
capital account, what impact does the foreign return have?" and thereby short circuit the very effect desired.
It is probably not "openness" that is being measured, but rather the ease of reallocation of portfolios when
asset stocks are fixed, ie, when the capital account is closed.
III. Estimation
Analysis of both the Japanese and Chilean data begins with the standard tests for unit roots and co-
integration (see appendix 2). If appropriate, an error correction model is fit to the pre-liberalization period
that is stable and parsimonious and possesses spherical, normally distributed disturbances. While desirable,
finding the "correct" model is not essential so long as the principal explanatory variables explain a substantial
fraction of the total variance and are reasonably orthogonal to the external rate of return. Similarly, the bias
induced by simultaneity is not of major concern if this bias is constant across the sample period. For most
specifications that follow, the explanatory variables can be credibly taken to be exogenous. In neither case is
a credible proxy for wealth available.
Numerous graphical and statistical tests are employed to test the stability of the model over the
liberalization period. The non-recursive tests use the full specification while the recursive tests use a more
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tightly parametrized specification with only ten independent variables due to software constraints. 2
Non-Recursive Tests
1. Visual inspection of the residuals both within sample (pre-liberalization) and a 36 month
prediction period, scaled by the full sample equation error variance.
2. The Forecast x
2
,
the statistical analogue to the first test compares the within sample and forecast
residual variances and is a test for numerical constancy of the parameters.
3. The "Forecast" Chow test for whether the residual sum of squares is significantly different when
the forecast period is included. When the second period is relatively long, it is of slightly lower power than
the Standard Chow test.
4. The Standard Chow test generated by fitting the model to both sub-periods independently and
comparing the Residual Sum of Squares of the constrained and unconstrained sub-periods.
Recursive Tests
5. The graph of one step Chow tests asks if parameter constancy can be rejected given a one-step
forecast with progressively longer base sample period. This, as with the following tuo tests, scales the Chow
tests to yield the horizontal critical value line at unity.
6. The Breakpoint Chow Test graphs sequences of Chow tests that progressively increase the sample
size used for estimation and uses the remaining sample for forecast tests.
7. The Forecast Chow test, related to the CUMSUMSQ test, uses a fixed estimation period to
forecast over progressively longer periods.
8. Recursive parameter estimates update using the information from each additional observation and
allow testing for individual parameter stability.
2 PC-GIVE, David Hendry, 1991,
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JAPAN
Comprehensive studies of the Japanese liberalization have been published by Frankel(1984) and
Eken(1984), and this paper will not attempt to offer more detail than they have provided. Throughout the
1970's, Japan imposed restrictions on foreign holdings of many types of financial instruments in an attempt
to prevent the Yen from appreciating against the other world currencies. These restrictions were eased only
slowly and with some reversals across the 1970's: In 1973, limits on non-resident stock and bond purchases
were abolished and those on foreign direct investment in various industries were eased; in 1974, ceilings on
loans from abroad were raised and the issue of bonds abroad by residents was made easier. But as of 1978,
non-residents were prohibited from purchasing Japanese bonds with less than five years maturity, effectively
ruling out short term capital inflows. With the rapid depreciation of the currency in 1979, the Japanese moved
quickly to loosen the remaining controls. Foreigners were permitted to hold Yen-denominated bonds, Gensaki
(three month repurchase agreements), Yen denominated CD's and "Impact Loans," (foreign currency loans
to Japanese non-bank residents). 3 The relaxation of controls at first applied only to short term loans, but in
1980 was extended to medium terms as well. Convincing evidence that the pre- 1979 controls were binding is
illustrated in graph 1. The three month Gensaki and Euro-Yen rates, both denominated in Yen and therefore
absent any currency risk, converge rapidly after the liberalization of short term flows and track one another
closely thereafter.
Estimation
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests cannot reject the presence of a unit root in all series nor can existence
of a cointegrating relationship between them. An error correction model is therefore fit to the pre-
liberalization period from 1973-79 that represents a stable parsimonious specification that explains 76% of
the variation in the Gensaki rate. As the first column of Table 1 shows, the inflation, industrial activity,
cumulative current account enter with the expected sign and significantly as does the Euro-Yen rate reflecting
3 Frenkei, p. 20
JAPAN: 3 Month Interest Rates
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its influence despite K barriers to short term flows. When domestic credit is included, the coefficients on
inflation and industrial activity and its own coefficient are unstable and of the wrong sign. Since it has
tremendous seasonal variation, the dummies are likely to be picking up some of its influence. The residual
from the cointegration regression is not significant and is dropped. The variables that enter
contemporaneously, industrial activity, the current account, and the Euro-Yen rate can be assumed to be
exogenous though again, the exact value of the parameters is not the goal.
By every measure of parameter stability, the specification breaks down after June 1979. The second
column of Table 1 shows virtually all domestic factors becoming insignificant and the Euro-Yen rate rising
to almost .7 and dramatically increasing in significance. The vastly increased variance in scaled residuals at
the break is verified by the %
2
test which rejects numerical constancy at any significance level as do both the
"Forecast" and standard Chow tests. The recursive tests tell the same story. The one-step Chow suggests that
the model forecasts abysmally in the immediate post liberalization period until the parameters are updated
to the open model and then predicts without significant forecasting errors. Breakpoint Chow test shows that
the pre-liberalization model predicts badly into the 1980's until the parameters are updated to the new "open"
model by mid- 1980. The Forecast Chow test shows satisfactory forecasting into late 1979 but then performs
poorly after liberalization. The recursive parameter estimates confirm that the breakdown is due to capital
account liberalization and not some other disturbance: the Euro-Yen rate coefficient shows significant
movement toward unity while the domestic factors move toward zero.
Testing for Interest Parity with No Forward Rate
In all likelihood, simply looking at the regression of the Gensaki rate on the Euro-Yen rate could
have yielded similar information with less complication. However, the point is to see if the same break point
can be found in the absence of a forward discount as will be the case with Chile. The experiment is repeated
dropping the Euro-Yen rate completely. The specification is shown in the third column of Table 1 and the
relevant graphs follow. The initial specification is very similar to the previous one that included the Euro-Yen
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rate suggesting the foreign return's relative orthogonality to the domestic factors. As before, there is evidence
of dramatic change in every test. The F-test suggests that despite the R 2 of .15 taken as a whole, the previous
explanatory variables now have no significant explanatory power. The recursive parameter estimates are less
clean than in the previous case as they try to pick up the dramatic 1980 rise in world rates. The story in
aggregate, however, remains the same: The 1979 liberalization caused a major reduction in the impact of
domestic factors on the Gensaki rate.
Page 9 Capital Account Liberalization
JAPAN: 3 Month Gensaki Rate Table 1
OLS (1st Diff)
With R* Without R*
Sample: 1976(5)- 1979(7)- 1976(5) - 1979(7) -
1979(6) 1986(12) 1979(6) 1986(12)
Variable:
Euro-Yen .1313
(3.9)
.558
(12.2)
Infl.3 .0081 -.00028 .01 -.0048
(2.84) (-.0737) (2.92) (-.76)
Ind. Act. .0868 .00038 .087 -.0043
(1.66) (.0148) (1.36) (-.10)
Curr. Acct. -.00086 -.00028 -.001 -.00056
(-2.22) (-1.718) (-2.28) (-2.05)
Constant .0028 .00085 .0027 .0015
(3.94) (1.45) (3.15) (1.53)
Jan -.0069 -.0041 -.0057 -.0063
(-3.74) (-2.72) (-2.55) (-2.49)
March -.0066 -.0019 -.0055 .00095
(-4.98) (-1.36) (-3.45) (.40)
April -.0057 -.00029 -.006 -.0031
(-4.32) (-.20) (-3.68) (-1.31)
May -.0037 .0022 -.0025 .0019
(-2.57) (1.59) (-1.46) (.81)
Sept -.0050 .00033 -.0045 .0011
(-3.75) (.237) (-2.74) (.45)
Oct -.0043 -.0013 -.0045 -.0028
(-2.99) (-.997) (-2.54) (-1.26)
R2 = .7643 .7075 .6312 .1533
a = .002 .0034 .0025 .0058
F-test: F[ 10,27] F[ 10,79] F[9,28] F[9,80]
8.76 [.00] 19.11 [.00] 5.33 [.0003] 1.61 [.127]
DW = 1.80 2.47 1.87 1.86
RSS = .00011 .00092 .00018 .00266
N= 38 N= 90 N = 38 N = 90
B-P Q(16) = 15.4 46.39 14.73 17.1
AR 1-j: j=3 j = 6 j = 5 j = 6
F[3,24] F[6,73] F[5,23] F[6,74]
.35 [.79] 3.26 [.007] .48 [.79] .93 [.48]
ARCH F[3,21] F[6,67] F[5,18] F[6,68]
.07 [.98] 1.16 [.34] .19 [.96] 2.5 [.03]
White Hetero- F[14,64] F[ 12,67]
skedasticity NA .88 [.58] NA 1.85 [.058]
J-B Normality
X
2(2) = .96 345.3 .01 157.28
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Tests of Parameter Constancy
1. Model with foreign interest rate:
a. Tests of Parameter constancy estimated with the 1976(5)- 1979(6) sample over the period 1979(7) - 1982(6):
Forecast Chi2(36)/36 = 15.19
CHOW TEST(36, 27) = 9.22 [.000]
b. CHOW test for structural break in 1979(7) for the complete 1976-1986 sample:
F(ll, 106) = 6.55 [.000]
2. Model without foreign interest rate:
a. Tests of Parameter constancy estimated with the 1976(5)- 1979(6) sample over the period 1979(7) - 1982(6):
Forecast ChF(36)/36 = 12.99
CHOW TEST(36, 28) = 10.70 [.000]
b. CHOW test for structural break in 1979(7) for the complete 1976-1986 sample:
F(10, 108) = 1.043 [ > 0.1 ]
JAPAN
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CHILE
The liberalization of the capital account occurred in the context a nearly complete transformation of
the country to a model neo-classical small economy. Tariffs were reduced to a uniform level of 10% by 1979,
government enterprises were largely privatized by 1975, and the budget deficit was reduced to zero by 1976.
The financial system was privatized and allocative quotas and interest rate ceilings were abolished in 1975-6.
The capital account liberalization occurred in stages with the principal measures facilitating
commercial bank access to the world capital markets.4 In September 1977, banks were permitted to import
capital through Article 14 of the exchange law subject to three broad categories of restrictions. First, they
were allowed to borrow only up to 20% of capital and reserves. This ceiling was gradually raised to 25%,
higher for longer maturity loans, 5 and then abolished completely in June 1979 in what is seen as the critical
movement toward freeing capital inflows.
Second, restrictions on the maturity structure of incoming loans and the requirement of non-interest
paying reserves held with the central bank worked in tandem to encourage longer term inflows. A minimum
maturity of 2 years for inflows was established in 1976. Graduated reserve requirements of 25% for loans under
3 years, 15% for 3-4 years, and 10% for over 4 years were implemented in June 1979 with the highest category
reduced to 15 % in July 1980. As a result, the average maturity of loans from 1979-82 was around five years.6
While this would seem to make tests of interest parity only valid in the very long run, this is not the case.
Banks were permitted to on-lend their foreign borrowings in Pesos, but by law, the loans were denominated
in Dollars. Thus the bank clients, most with only 90 day loans, held the exchange risk and were therefore the
relevant arbitragers.
A final restriction set the rate at which Dollar loans could be converted into Pesos in an attempt to
control liquidity. Prior to June 1979, the larger of 5% of capital and reserves or S2 million could be
See Ffrench-Davis and Arellano(1981) in Spanish and Corbo(1985) and Mathieson(1983) for a more extensive discussion.
In April 1978, the limit was raised to 45% for capital flows over 3 years. It was then raised to 60% in December 1978 and 70% in
April 1979 before being abolished entirely in June 1979.
6 Edwards(1985), pg 55
CHILE: 3 Month Interest Rates (Monthly)
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converted into pesos each month. This restriction was eliminated in June 1979 with the global lending limits,
but reimposed in September at 5% or Si million until April 1980 when the limit was again raised to SUS 2
million. The repeated fine tuning would seem to imply that the restriction was binding.
That critical controls were in fact lifted by June 1979 and at the latest by April 1980 is suggested by
the sheer volume of inflows which doubled in 1980 and virtually doubled again in 1981, reaching an
astronomical 25% of GDP (See appendix 3). After an initial decline of real interest rates to 13% in 1980, the
first months of 1981 saw a rapid rise to sustained levels of 40%. Given the vast flows of capital and the
increasingly severe overvaluation of the peso as inflation persisted despite a pegged exchange rate, an appeal
to uncovered interest parity and high expectations of depreciation as an explanation seems logical.
However, from the model elaborated earlier, it is clear that the key factor determining whether
domestic or foreign variables are determining interest rates is the degree of substitutability between foreign
and domestic assets. Intermittent inflows, however vast, will simply leave the closed economy regime
occasionally shocked by one time increases in the money supply. Between inflows, however, a rise in the
interest rate due to any domestic factor would not be immediately offset by capital inflows and interest parity
would not hold.
The liquidity quotas might have created just this effect as would the way medium and long term capital
arrived in Chile. Every three to six months, several large banks would cooperate in a syndicated paper issue
in the world financial centers. 7 In the periods between when disbursements would arrive and be distributed
through the various subsidiaries of the involved national banks, there might be no response to even substantial
movements in interest differentials such as might be expected in situations where short term inflows were
permitted.8 Despite the fact that the relevant market for establishing interest parity was the 30-90 day market
Hugo Ovando, Manager, Banco de Chile, interview 1988. About 50% of capital inflows come through the Banco de Chile.
o
The lumpiness of capital inflows would explain the very weak relation found between the interest rate spread and capital inflows.
Edwards (1987) cites a Corbo study that was unable to find any link while Sjaastad (1983) found only a weak relationship between August
1979 and December 1980.
Because demand for cheaper foreign credit continually exceeded supply, Chilean banks would provide a mix of peso and dollar
loans with the weights dependent on the quality of the customer sometimes adding a mark-up of close to 10-20 % over libor that accrued
as pure monopoly rents. The remaining much-reduced spread between Dollar and Peso interest rates might represent expectations of
devaluation on the part of the borrowers, but of a far smaller magnitude than is commonly believed. Ovando interview, 1988.
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where the syndicated paper issues were relent, the lumpiness of the original inflows may have left many
arbitragers rationed in their holdings of Dollar loans leaving the Peso denominated side of the market
determined by domestic factors.
Estimation
Since preliminary testing was unable to reject the presence of unit roots in most variables though did
reject cointegration, the model was estimated in first differences for the period 1976:6 to 1979:6. Table 2
shows a good specification for 30-90 day deposit rates in the pre-liberalization period that explains almost 75%
of the variance with lags of realized inflation, industrial activity, and domestic credit. Lagged inflation can be
interpreted as proxying for expectations of future inflation and gratifyingly sum close to one as the Fisher
equation would predict. Despite the long lag structures, both Schwartz and Hannan-Quinn criteria suggest
a significant decline in model performance with a more parsimonious specification. The cumulative current
account enters insignificantly and with the wrong sign suggesting, most likely, the crudeness of the proxy.
Again, the correctness of the specification is less important than the fact that a large share of the variance is
explained with variables that would be plausibly orthogonal to R*.
The eight tests for parameter stability strongly reject any change in how interest rates were determined
after the capital account was opened in June of 1979, the raising of liquidation quotas April of 1980, or the
small readjustment of reserve requirements in July 1980. Visual inspection of the scaled residuals suggests
a break in early 1981, but not before. This is corroborated by the %
2
test which suggests that the model
predicts marginally worse over the post-liberalization period overall, not due to innovations in 1980, where
X
2 Forecast and standard Chow tests reject break, but after January 1981. When the model is estimated
including the 1979-80:12 period, the parameters are similar in magnitude and significance and the Chow and
X tests strongly suggest break thereafter. The model thus appears to break up in prediction seven months
after the most recent significant reform, a lag that seems too long to be due to a sudden convergence to
interest parity.
The recursive estimates provide a more or less similar story. The one-step Chow tests show no major
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CHILE: 30-90 day deposit rate
OLS(lst Diff)
Table 2
Sample 1976(6)- 1976(6)- 1979(7)-
1979(6) 1980(12) 1982(12)
Variable
libor .477 .528 .147
(.696) (1.02) (.287)
infl.l .173 .134 .174
(2.78) (2.5) (1.86)
infl.2 .275 .241 -.123
(5.42) (5.5) (-1.04)
infl.3 .276 .204 .176
(4.32) (3.8) (1.47)
infl.4 .12 .098 .152
(2.61) (2.4) (1.34)
infl.5 .14 .103 .056
(2.68) (2.2) (.52)
Ind. Act.l 2.98 2.24 -1.17
(3.35) (3.08) (-1.53)
Ind. Act. 2 2.37 2.14 1.29
(2.63) (2.8) (1.55)
Ind. Act.
3
.51 .125 .317
(.547) (.158) (.38)
Ind. Act. 4 1.14 .53 -.216
(1.22) (.688) (-.31)
Ind. Act.5 2.96 1.96 -1.09
(3.3) (2.72) (-1.81)
Dom. Cred.4 -.092 -.068 .0006
(-2.0) (-2.31) (.038)
Constant -.137 -.176 .018
(-1.33) (-2.12) (.28)
R2 = .7438 .6296 .3795
a = .5514 .5217 .3852
F-test: F[ 12,24] F[ 12,42] F[ 12,29]
5.81 [.00] 5.95 [.00] 1.48 [.189]
DW = 1.98 1.88 1.71
RSS = 7.296 11.433 4.302
N= 37 N= 55 N= 42
B-P Q(16) = 16.27 15.53 12.66
AR 1-j: j=5 j = 4 j = 3
F[5,19] F[4,38] F[3,26]
.29 [.91] .05 [.99] .35 [.79]
ARCH: F[5,14] F[4,34] F[3,23]
.47 [.79] .13 [.97] .65 [.59]
J-B Normality:
X
2(2) = .69 1.82 .42
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Tests of Parameter Constancy
a. Tests of parameter constancy estimated with the 1976(6)- 1979(6) sample over the period 1979(7) - 1982(6):
Forecast Chi2(36)/36 = 2.11
CHOW TEST(36, 24) = .91 [.6044]
b. Tests of parameter constancy estimated with the 1976(6)- 1979(6) sample over the period 1979(7) - 1980(12):
Forecast Chi2(18)/18 = 1.03
CHOW TEST(18, 24) = .76 [.726]
c. Tests of parameter constancy estimated with the 1976(6)-1980(12) sample over the period 1981(1) - 1982(6):
Forecast Chi 2(18)/18 = 2.34
CHOW TEST(18, 24) = 1.2 [.306]
d. CHOW test for structural break in 1979(7) for the complete 1976-1982 sample:
F(13, 53) = 3.02 [.000]
e. CHOW test for structural break in 1980(12) for the complete 1976-1982 sample:
F(13, 53) = 2.02 [Significant at 5%]
f. CHOW test for structural break in 1979(7) for the 1976(6)-1980(12) sample:
F(13, 29) = 1.01 [ > .1 ]
a'. Tests of parameter constancy estimated with the 1976(6)- 1979(6) sample over the period 1979(7) - 1982(6)
with 10 explanatory variables:
Forecast Chi2(36)/36 = .92
CHOW TEST(36, 27) = .51 [.969]
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prediction error of the closed economy model until mid- 1982, a period when the Chilean economy began
sliding dramatically into depression and major policy changes were being implemented. Neither the Break-
Point Chow or Forecast Chow test suggest any break at all. Except for Domestic Credit, which converges to
zero very late, there is no evidence of significant structural break in the parameters, surprisingly, even in
January 1981. This is likely to be due to the reduced explanatory power of the more tightly parameterized
specification used for the recursive tests (R 2 = .63 vs. .74) which in the non-recursive estimation reject break
after 1979:6 altogether by both x
2
and Forecast Chow tests.
Taken together, however, there appears no evidence of the kind that emerged so strikingly in the
Japanese case that international financial arbitrage forces were driving the Chilean interest rate after 1979.
This offers some support for the intermittent flow scenario: the occasional large injections of liquidity might
shift the overall level of interest rates, leading, theoretically, to a one time prediction error in the formulation
in differences, but not to a fundamental change in the coefficients of the interest rate equation.
If not convergence to interest parity, then what is causing the collapse of the interest rate equation
in January 1981? Were there new domestic factors that might support the jump in interest rates to
dramatically high levels and render previous determinants less important? Plausibly yes. In late 1980 and 1981
the Chilean "boom," as it has been called, came into full flower generating extraordinary demands for credit.
A euphoria set in where people expected the economy to continue growing at rates of 10% a year and the
Finance Minister was predicting a doubling of GDP in ten years (Schmitt-Hebel 1986, Barandarian 1983
Edwards 1987).9 Beginning in late 1980, consumer credit demand increased between 10 and 20% in real terms
per month while savings levels halved to the lowest levels in Chilean history. Blistering ferment in the real
estate industry saw land prices in some areas of Santiago more than sextuple their price two years earlier
(Arellano 1983). In ailing sectors of the real economy, Harberger(1985), Frankel and Mizala(1985) and
Arellano(1983) have postulated a large demand for credit arising from illiquid and reform-damaged firms
Sergio de Castro, 1980 state of the economy speech. Also of interest was Labor minister Jose Pinera's 1980 speech to 3,000 union
leaders where he claimed that Chile "in ten years would be a developed nation... where 70% of the population would have color T.V.s."
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rolling over debts at high interest rates. In the absence of elastic capital flows, these demands for credit, not
explicitly modeled in the pre-1979 model, could have plausibly caused its breakdown in 1981.
Conclusion
This paper has presented a method of establishing the impact of liberalizing the capital account on
domestic interest rates when credible proxies for expectations of depreciation are not available. A model of
interest rate determination during liberalization is tested using a variety of tests for structural break on the
Japanese experience in 1979-80 with and without a foreign return and then on Chile 1979-82 for which forward
rates are not available. Chilean interest rates are shown to behave as if determined domestically, despite vast
inflows, until very late in the reform period. It has been argued that the way in which capital enters an
economy is shown to be as important as the amount in determining whether interest parity will hold, with the
critical determinant being the responsiveness of capital flows to interest differentials.
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Appendix 1
JAPAN: Data
30 Day Gensaki(repurchase agreement) Rates (IDEP) Monthly, Morgan Financial World.
30 Day Euro-Yen Deposit Rates Morgan Financial World.
Output/Income (INACT) Monthly index of industrial activity International Monetary Fund International
Financial Statistics (IMF/IFS)
Domestic Credit (DC) IMFMFS deflated by the PPI.
Cumulative Current Account Balance (CUMCA) IMF/IFS deflated by PPI
Expectations of Inflation (INFL) Several lags of realized monthly inflation. IMFMFS
CHILE: Data
30-90 Day deposit Rates (IDEP) Monthly, Boletin Mensual, Banco Central de Chile (BCC).
Output/Income (INACT) the monthly index of industrial activity.(BCC)
Domestic Credit (DC) The Central bank changed the composition of its domestic credit series numerous times
and twice significantly from 1976-82. The analysis uses the homogeneous series generated by Vial and Marin
(1986) deflated by the CPI.
Cumulative Current Account Balance (CUMCA) The monthly trade balance was constructed from BCC export
and import statistics standardized on the IMF BOP yearly aggregates. Transfers and non-interest services are
the IMF yearly aggregates allocated equally across months. The monthly series on interest payments on
Article 14 inflows was inflated so that yearly totals equalled the IMF total net interest payments. The sum
yields a passable monthly measure of the current account surplus which is then deflated by the CPI. BCC, IMF
Expectations of Inflation (INFL) Several lags of realized monthly inflation. BCC
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Appendix II
JAPAN: Unit Root and Cointegration Tests
Dickey's "t"
Variable Level 1st Difference
Gensaki -1.93 -10.97
Euro-yen -2.2 -13.07
Inflation -2.02 -4.97
Ind. Act. -1.36 -6.5
Domestic Cred. -1.6 -4.7
Cum. Curr. Acct. -.60 -.65
The null model is yt = a + ylA + e t (e t white noise). The sample sizes go from 119 to 131. According to
Dickey's table (Fuller, 1976), the 5% critical values for the test-statistics are -2.89 and -2.88 with sample sizes
of 100 and 250 respectively. The cumulative current account still appears non-stationary in first differences
but because all other series appear 1(1), we do not difference further.
Co-integrating Regression:
gen = .081 +.67 euryen - .012 inact
(2.35) (24.1) (-1.5)
.005 infl - .00004 cumca - .0004 dc
(-.79) (-1.98) (-.52)
R2 = .90 DW = .81 s.e. = .0055
Cointegration Test:
The t-statistic of the model e
t
= a etl + e t for the residuals of the cointegrating regression with 6 variables
is -5.88. Though Engle and Yoo (1987) tabulate critical values only up to 5 variables (-5.02 at 1% for 200
observations), they appear to increase at most by .43 per additional variable. Using this exceedingly crude
measure, it is unlikely that cointegration can be rejected at the 5% or even 1% level. An error correction
model is therefore employed as the first specification.
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CHILE: Unit Root and Cointegration Tests
Dickey's "t"
Variable Level 1st Difference
Deposit Rate -4.6 -8.11
Libor -2.15 -10.6
Inflation -2.49 -7.9
Ind. Activity -2.1 -7.3
Dom. Credit -.42 -11.4
Cum. Curr. Acct. -.26 -2.93
The null model is y, = a + y t .j + e t (e, white noise). The sample size is N = 79. According to Dickey's table
(Fuller, 1976), the 5% critical values for the test-statistics are -2.89 and -2.93 with sample sizes of 100 and 50
respectively.
Cointegrating Regression:
dep = 24.72 - 2.15 libor - 3.93 inact + .167 infl + .001 cumca - .015 dc
(4.02) (-2.5) (-3.02) (1.5) (1.78) (-.88)
R2 = .596 DW = .71 s.e. = 1.265
Cointegration Test:
The t-statistic of the model e
t
= a e, j + e
t
for the residuals of the cointegrating regression is -3.986. Engle
and Yoo (1987) found a critical value of -4.26 at 10% for 100 observations and 5 variables. There are two
problems. First, since our dependent variable is 1(0), the regression on two uncorrected 1(1) variables would
lead to 1(0) residuals and a false test for cointegration. A necessary condition would seem cointegration
among the independent variables. However, since the critical values only increase with additional variables,
even the standard regression appears to reject cointegration so the hypothesis of no cointegration is accepted
in this case.
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Appendix III
CHILE: Selected Macro Indicators, 1973-82
Real Int. Net K C.A. RER
Year %GDP Rate CPI Inflows Surplus i PT/PN
1973 -3.7 487.5 -294
1974 0.4 497.8 -211
1975 -8.4 127.20 379.2 57.9 -491 1.652
1976 1.6 65.15 234.5 238.0 148 1.753
1977 9.4 57.97 113.8 240.2 -551 1.123
1978 9.6 43.65 49.8 678.7 -1088 0.991
1979 9.9 16.98 36.6 921.8 -1189 0.955
1980 9.7 13.24 35.1 1809.0 -1971 1.025
1981 5.4 39.72 19.7 2947.5 -4814 0.845
1982 -15.1 38.01 9.9 859.5 -2382 0.642
Source: Corbo 1985, Banco Central de Chile.
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